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      Abstract—Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) play a critical role in the movement of crude 
oil from its production sites to end users. Such systems are complex because they often operate in a 
dynamic environment. Safe operations of the key components in PTSs such as port and shipping are 
vital for the success of the systems. Risk assessment is a powerful tool to ensure the safe transportation 
of crude oil. This paper applies a mathematical model to identify and evaluate the operational hazards 
associated with PTSs, by incorporating a Fuzzy Rule-Based (FRB) method with Bayesian Networks 
(BNs). Its novelty lies in the realisation of risk analysis and prioritisation of the hazards in PTSs when 
historical failure data is not available. This hybrid model is capable of assisting decision-makers in 
measuring and improving the PTSs’ safety, and dealing with the inherent uncertainties in risk data. 
      Keywords— Bayesian belief network; fuzzy set theory; maritime risk; maritime transport; petroleum 
transportation 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Petroleum supply chains have a strategic impact on global, national, and local economy. Various 
operational activities need to be undertaken properly at different stages within supply chains. Such activities 
involve exploration and production, the conversion of crude oil to refined products, and storage intended for 
reaching a desired market. These operational activities are complicated in nature and render petroleum supply 
chains highly risky.  
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Petroleum Transportation Systems (PTSs) play a vital role in the flow of crude oil. The PTSs enable the 
movement of crude and/or refined products from starting point (i.e. production sites or storage tanks) to their 
final destinations, via land and/or sea. During the crude oil journey through the Petroleum Supply Chain 
(PSC), multiple systems are involved, including nodes such as ports and depots and links like pipelines, 
tankers, and rail systems (Kazemi and Szmerekovsky, 2015). To ensure the smooth flow of the products within 
the system, tankers and pipelines are the two most commonly used transportation modes (Pootakham and 
Kumar, 2010; Herrán, et al., 2010). While ports act as the connecting points between the transportation modes, 
pipelines and tankers are used for inland and sea transportation, respectively.  
The U.S. Energy Information Administration (2014) stated that, in 2013, 56.5 million barrels of oil per day 
(bbl/d) were transported by sea. In other words, about 63% of total world crude oil production (i.e. 90.1 million 
bbl/d) was moved through PTSs. In addition, the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2017) stated that, 
96.7 million bbl/d was the total world production of crude oil, where 58.9 million bbl/d (i.e. about 61% of the 
total production) was carried via sea transportation systems in 2015. It highlighted the rapid growth in crude 
oil production and its high demand market. The great demand on this critical product led to an increase in the 
quantity of crude oil that was transported within the PTSs (i.e. 2.4 million bbl/d increase in crude oil 
movement). For that reason, production and consumption of crude oil is highly associated with economic 
development. Therefore, ensuring PTS operation in a safe condition, is a significant element for sustaining 
global and local industries. If an unwanted event strikes any of the systems within the PTSs, its consequences 
will affect the overall petroleum industry. Therefore, it is vital to identify and assess the hazards affecting 
PTSs, and improve the overall safety and reliability of the systems. 
The aim of this paper is to apply an advanced risk assessment technique for evaluating the risk of PTSs’ 
operational hazards. It provides decision-makers with an advanced risk analysis tool capable of dealing with 
the issues such as lack of existing data and high level of uncertainty in PTSs operational assessment, which 
make it impossible to employ classical risk analysis techniques (e.g. probabilistic risk analysis). In this paper, 
an established Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Networks (FRBN) methodology is applied in the new context of 
PTSs. The Bayesian Network (BN) mechanism is used to synthesize all IF-THEN rules with belief structures, 
and to detect the failure priority values of PTSs hazards. This assessment model is capable of assisting 
decision-makers to understand the PTSs’ safety, in order to enhance the effectiveness of their operations. To 
accomplish this aim, the paper starts with the identification of the research gap of previous PTSs studies in 
Section II. It is followed by an overview analysis of Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and BN 
methods. Section III includes a step-by-step description of the methodology that has been used for evaluating 
and prioritising the risk levels of the PTSs’ operational hazards. The proposed methodology is demonstrated 
by investigating a real PTS case study in Section IV. Finally, the conclusion, with the discussion of future 
work, is presented in Section V. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Risk Assessment of Petroleum Transport 
The nature of a PSC requires extreme priority to be placed on safety. Risk management plays a critical role 
in ensuring the transportation system resilience in the context of PSCs. Recent studies highlight the importance 
of the PTSs’ safety, during the transportation of crude oil. A careful literature review has revealed that several 
studies have been conducted on operational risk and reliability relating to PTSs, but most have the analysis 
conducted from a segment level a for single system (i.e. port, ship, or pipeline system), instead of a systematic 
perspective. For instance, Mokhtari, et al. (2011) proposed a step-by-step fuzzy risk analysis in order to 
evaluate the overall risk level of petroleum sea ports and terminals. Pak, et al., (2015) used a fuzzy Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) technique for evaluating the factors that influence ports’ safety from ship captains’ 
perspectives. Rao and Raghavan (1995) proposed a cause-consequence analysis to detect hazard events 
associated with ports installation. Yuhua and Datao (2005) developed a risk-based modelling technique using 
fuzzy Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for analysing the failures associated with oil and gas transmission pipelines. 
Shahriar, et al. (2012) proposed the combination of a bow-tie method and fuzzy logic to overcome the 
vagueness of oil and gas pipelines. Uğurlu, et al. (2015) used FTA for analysing the collision and grounding 
of oil tanker accidents depending on the data collected from theGlobal Integrated Shipping Information 
System (GISIS) from 1998 to 2010. Martins and Maturana (2013), proposed a risk assessment technique using 
Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) while investigating human elements during oil tanker operations. Further 
research such as Mokhtari, et al. (2012) and Ronza, et al. (2006) focused on the local level of the petroleum 
ports, while studies such as Restrepo, et al. (2015) and Trucco, et al. (2008) focused on the tankers or pipeline 
systems. Within the environment of supply chains, optimal risk controls at segment/local levels of a single 
system without considering other involved operational systems might not necessarily confirm the highest 
safety at the system level. It consequently reveals a research area needed to be fulfilled. 
The connections within PTSs form a complex system. This is demonstrated by the fact that there are 
multiple sub-systems (i.e. ports, tankers and pipelines) engaged within its operations. Therefore, in this paper, 
each of these three key sub-systems is further investigated, to detect their individual hazards on the same 
measurement plate. A failure in the PTSs is not necessarily due to the occurrence of a whole series of errors. 
Nevertheless, a single failure or mistake might be the cause leading to the system’s failure. Through carrying 
out a careful identification process (i.e. literature review), the hazards within petroleum ports and 
transportation modes (i.e. ship and pipeline), have been selected. The highlighted hazards have been further 
verified by domain experts in several meetings that took place in 2015 and 2016. 
B. Fuzzy Rule-Based Bayesian Reasoning 
FMEA has been defined as a step-by-step procedure for evaluating safety and reliability of failure modes 
and effects (Liu, et al. 2013). FMEA is probably one of the most common and widely used techniques in 
safety and reliability analysis. In the mid 20 century, the FMEA approach was firstly introduced to the 
aerospace industry. Its popularity has been spread across different industries, such as aerospace, automotive, 
nuclear, and medical to improve their production safety and reliability (Sankar and Prabju, 2001; Aldridge, et 
al., 1991; Russomanno, et al., 1992). In the traditional FMEA, the level of safety of each failure mode is 
determined by three parameters; Likelihood (Lk), Consequence (Cs) and Probability (Pb) (Yang et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, the traditional FMEA method suffered from some drawbacks that have been criticised by 
numerous scholars, such as the problem associated with the Risk Priority Number (RPN) (Wang, et al., 2009; 
Chin, et al., 2009). To overcome these weaknesses, and improve the FMEA performance, uncertainty based 
techniques, such as artificial neural networks (Keskin and Özkan, 2009), Dempster-Shafer theory (Liu, et al., 
2005), fuzzy set theory (Xu, et al., 2002), grey theory (Pillay and Wang, 2003), evidential reasoning (Yang, 
2001), and Monte Carlo simulation (Bevilacqua, et al., 2000) have been proposed in the literature. In addition, 
Emovon, et al. (2015) used VIseKriterijumska Optimizacija I Kompromisno Resenje (VIKOR) technique and 
FMEA in developing an assessment model to prioritize the failures in a medical system. Puente, et al. (2002) 
presented an improved qualitative rule-based method in FMEA to overcome the traditional FMEA problems 
for risk ranking. Guimarães and Lapa (2007) proposed fuzzy rule-based in FMEA in nuclear engineering in 
addressing the questions related to the traditional RPN while prioritizing the failures. Liu, et al. (2014) 
combined interval 2-tuple linguistic variables with grey relational analysis to improve the effectiveness of the 
traditional FMEA in medical services. Jiang, et al. (2017) developed an advance risk ranking method based 
on fuzzy evidential theory in a Micro-Electro-Mechanical System (MEMS). Tazi, et al. (2017) integrated cost 
factors to traditional FMEA to improve system design reliability of wind turbine systems.  
FRBN was developed by Yang, et al. (2008) to overcome the traditional FMEA drawbacks. This advanced 
hybrid technique was established in order to identify failure priority values, by using the mechanism of 
Bayesian Reasoning to conduct Fuzzy Rule-Based (FRB) risk inference (Alyami, et al., 2014; Yang et al., 
2015). The FRBN improves the accuracy of failure assessment while not significantly increasing complication 
of the relevant calculation (Yang, et al., 2008). In other words, it increases the result accuracy compared to 
the traditional FMEA approach without compromising the visibility and easiness of the traditional FEMA”. 
A BN method was developed in the 1970s, based on the marriage of the basic Bayesian theory and graphical 
networking techniques. A BN is a graphical model that provides a decision-support framework for problems 
involving uncertainty, complexity and probabilistic reasoning (Nadkarni and Shenoy, 2001; Ben-Gal, 2007). 
In addition, a BN demonstrates the fundamental concept of probabilistic graphical models, or probabilistic 
networks. Eleye-Datubo, et al. (2006) and Khakzad, et al. (2013) highlighted that directed graph and 
Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs), which play critical rules in identifying the relationship between the 
modelled variables, are the two main components of any BN. For dealing with uncertain knowledge, the 
technique has been extensively and successfully applied in various fields such as medical (Spiegelhalter, et 
al., 2013), transportation (Li, et al., 2014), engineering (Feng, et al., 2014), management (Rahman, et al., 
2015), and many others. Within the petroleum industry, Cai, et al. (2013) used BN to measure the human 
factors risk in offshore systems. Ren, et al. (2008) integrated Swiss Cheese model and BN to evaluate offshore 
safety. A BN model was developed by Antão, et al. (2009) for maritime shipping accidents based on the 
Portuguese Maritime Authority database. Trucco, et al. (2008) proposed a BN to model the maritime 
transportation system by integrating human and organizational factors into risk analysis.  
The beauty of BN lies in its ability in providing a powerful analysis tool due to its capability in capturing 
non-linear causal relationships (Yang, et al., 2008; Alyami et al., 2014). It can be used to undertake two 
directional forward risk prediction and backward risk diagnosis (Yang et al., 2009a; Hu et al., 2008). The 
traditional BN graphical structure consists of: 1) a set of nodes, representing variables connected by 2) a set 
of edges representing the dependence between these variables (Trucco, et al., 2008; Riahi, et al., 2008). The 
direction of the edge represents the relationship of each node to another node (Alyami, et al., 2014). The edge 
starts from a parent node and ends with an arrowhead pointing to a child node. If a parent node has no its own 
parents, it is also called a “root” node. Nodes without child nodes are called “leaf” nodes (Trucco, et al., 2008; 
Vinnem, et al., 2012). 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The nature of PTSs makes the system operates in unsafe and unstable environment. Hence, subjective data 
based on expert judgements are used to complement the incompleteness of objective data. In this paper, an 
assessing model is constructed and an amalgamation of FRB in FMEA and BN is employed for evaluating 
the risk of the hazards associated with the PTSs. A FRB is employed to model the conditional statements as 
well as to incorporate the overall knowledge. In addition, a BN is used to provide a decision-supporting 
framework, for the evaluation of the hazards associated with the petroleum ports, ships, and pipeline systems 
operations within the PTSs, through the use of probabilistic reasoning. For analysing the PTSs’ operational 
hazards, a step-by-step analysis procedure is presented in Fig. 1 and described as follows: 
Step 1. Identify the PTSs hazards. 
Step 2. Establish fuzzy IF-THEN rules within FMEA. 
Step 3. Develop a BN model and aggregate the rules by using BN mechanism. 
Step 4. Prioritise the PTSs’ hazards. 
Step 5. Sensitivity analysis. 
Identify the PTSs operational 
hazards through conducting 
literature review
Validation of the identified hazard in the 
literature review by experts 
Establish fuzzy IF-THEN rules within 
FMEA
Developed a BN model
Calculate the risk though aggregate the 
rules by using the developed BN 
mechanism
Obtaining a crisp value for each of the 
PTSs Hazards
Prioritise the PTSs Hazards













Fig. 1. The PTSs’ assessment model flow chart. 
A. Identify the PTSs Hazards (Step 1) 
This step identifies the Hazards (Hs) related to PTSs. This identification process provides decision-makers 
with a clear picture of the hazards associated with the working environment to ensure the safety of the system. 
The PTSs consist of two sub-systems: ports and transportation modes. Tankers and pipelines are the two major 
transportation modes within this system (see Fig.2).  
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Fig. 2. Main hierarchical structure of the hazards in the PTSs. 
Due to the complexity of the process of identifying the hazards in PTSs, a cause and effect analysis 
technique (Chang and Lin, 2006) has been used in this study. An extensive literature review was conducted 
to identify the hazards that influence the safe operations of crude oil terminals, pipelines, and ships. (Ceyhun, 
2014; Vinnem et al., 2012; Ismail and Karim, 2013; Cai et al., 2013). Furthermore, through conducting a 
brainstorming technique, consultation with domain experts has been carried out to determine whether the 
identified hazards exist in the investigated PTSs operations or not. To obtain better results in identifying PTSs 
hazards within these meetings, what-if analysis, which is a brainstorming approach, is used. What-if analysis 
is a popular technique and possibly one of the oldest hazard identification methods; it involves simply asking 
a series of questions that begin with ‘what if’ (Khan and Abbasi, 1998; Kavianian et al., 1992; Golfarelli and 
Rizzi, 2010). These consultation meetings took place in November 2015 in the UK and in January 2016 in 
Saudi Arabia with nineteen petroleum/refined petroleum products’ terminal managers, pipeline and ship 
operators, and scholars. Within these meetings, the researcher asked the experts a number of questions start 
with ‘what if’ (i.e. What if the communication system Breakdown during operation?) Consequently, the 
hazards that are most influential on the PTSs’ safety are listed in Table. I. The index of each hazard is 
expressed by the combination of the number of hazards and the symbols of the sub-systems. For instance, the 
hazard in the first row and first column, company policies is indexed as Po-H1.   
Table I: Hazards associated with the operation of each system within the PTSs 
 Port Transportation System Ship Transportation System Pipeline Transportation System 
H 1 Company Policies 
Ship Collision due to Main Engine 
Failure 
Sabotage 
H 2 Company Standards 
Ship Collision due to Bridge 
Navigation Equipment Failure 
Workers Actions 
H 3 Management Procedure 
Ship Collision due to 
Communication System Failure 
Weather Condition 
H 4 Inattention 
Ship Collision due to Wrong use of 
Navigation Equipment 
Geological Hazards 
H 5 Neglect 
Ship Collision due to Lack of 
Communication 
Material Failure 
H 6 Fatigue 
Ship Collision due to Failure to 
Follow Operational Procedure 
Construction Failure 
H 7 Skills Action To Avoid Collision Maintenance Failure 
H 8 Overfill 
Ship Collision due to Human 
Inattention 
Failure to Follow Procedure 
H 9 
SOPs (Standard Operating 
Procedures) Not Followed 
Ship Collision due to Human 
Neglect 
Internal Corrosion 
H 10 Overpressure 




Release From Loading 
Arm/SBM 
Ship Collision due to Human Skills  
H 12 Understaffing 
Ship Collision due to Weather 
Condition 
 
H 13 Breakdown of Communication 






Ship Grounding due to Main 
Engine Failure 
 
H 15 Wrong Signals 
Ship Grounding due to 
Communication System Failure 
 
H 16 Procedural Failure 
Ship Grounding due to Bridge 
Navigation Equipment Failure 
 
H 17 
Collision between Ship and 
Other Ship/Berth 
Ship Grounding due to Wrong use 
of Navigation Equipment 
 
H 18 Lack of Tools/Spare Parts 






Ship Grounding due to Failure to 
Follow Operational Procedure 
 
H 20 
Use of Inappropriate 
Tools/Spare Parts 
Ship Grounding due to Rout 
Selection 
 
H 21 Maintenance Omission 




Lack of Communication 
System 
Ship Grounding due to Human 
Inattention 
 
H 23 Lack of Lighting System 
Ship Grounding due to Human 
Neglect 
 
H 24 Lack of Movable Facilities 
Ship Grounding due to Human 
Fatigue 
 
H 25 A/C System Failure 
Ship Grounding due to Human 
Skills 
 
H 26 Control System Failure 
Ship Grounding due to Weather 
Condition 
 
H 27 Instrument Failure 
Ship Grounding due to Third Party 
Activity 
 
H 28 Valve Failure 
Ship Grounding due to Water 
Depth 
 
H 29 Hose/Pump Failure 
Hull Failure due to Construction 
Damage 
 
H 30 Gasket Failure Hull Failure due to Hull Corrosion  
H 31 Pipeline Failure 
Hull Failure due to Maintenance 
Failure 
 
H 32 Loading Arm/SBM Failure 
Hull Failure due to Stowage 
Planning Failure 
 
H 33 Power Failure Hull Failure due to Collision  
H 34 Cathodic Protection Failure Hull Failure due to Grounding  
H 35 Heavy Rainfall 
Fire/Explosion due to Human 
Inattention 
 
H 36 Flood 
Fire/Explosion due to Human 
Neglect 
 
H 37 Snow 
Fire/Explosion due to Human 
Skills 
 
H 38 Hurricane 
Fire/Explosion due to Inert 
Gas/Ventilation System Failure 
 
H 39 Tornadoes 
Fire/Explosion due to Electric 
Failure 
 
H 40 Lightning 
Fire/Explosion due to Pumping 
Room Failure 
 
H 41 Earthquake 
Fire/Explosion due to Main Engine 
Failure 
 
H 42 Tsunami 
Fire/Explosion due to Heating 
system Failure 
 
H 43  
Fire/Explosion due to Spread of 
Fire From Other Object 
 
H 44  Fire/Explosion due to Sabotage  
H 45  
Fire/Explosion due to Weather 
Condition 
 
H 46  
Equipment  Failure due to Pipe 
Failure 
 
H 47  
Equipment  Failure due to Valve 
Failure 
 
H 48  
Equipment  Failure due to Pump 
Failure 
 
H 49  
Equipment  Failure due to Tank 
Gauging System 
 
H 50  
Equipment  Failure due to 
Manifold Failure 
 
H 51  
Equipment  Failure due to Power 
Failure 
 
H 52  
Equipment  Failure due to Heating 
System Failure 
 
H 53  
Equipment  Failure due to Loading 
Computer 
 
H 54  
Equipment  Failure due to 
Maintenance Error 
 
H 55  
Equipment  Failure due to 
Maintenance Omission 
 
H 56  
Equipment  Failure due to Lack of 
Communication 
 
H 57  
Equipment  Failure due to 
Procedural Failure 
 
H 58  
Equipment  Failure due to Human 
Inattention 
 
H 59  
Equipment  Failure due to Human 
Neglect 
 
H 60  
Equipment  Failure due to Human 
Fatigue 
 
H 61  
Equipment  Failure due to Human 
Skills 
 
B. Establish Fuzzy IF-THEN Rules within FMEA (Step 2) 
Three risk parameters are employed to analyse failure modes in the traditional FMEA. For constructing a 
fuzzy IF-THEN rule with a belief structure for PTSs, the occurrence probability of a risk event during the 
process of oil transport (Pl), consequence severity that the risk event causes when it occurs (Sc), and probability 
that the risk event cannot be detected before it occurs (Dp) are defined as FMEA factors. Pl, Sc and Dp are the 
three risk parameters that are used in the IF part. However, in the THEN part, the risk level (R) is presented. 
Very High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low are the set of linguistic variables used to describe Pl, Sc, Dp 
and R (Mokhtari, et al., 2012; Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii, et al., 2001). These grades describe the linguistic 
variables of each attribute associated with the PTSs’ Hs. Through considering experts’ judgements, the degree 
of each parameter is valued with regard to each identified hazard. Tables II, III and IV illustrate the attributes’ 
linguistic variables, where each parameter is defined based on knowledge accrued from past events.  
Table II: Linguistic grades for the occurrence probability parameter for each H in the IF part (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii, et al., 
2001; Liu, et al., 2011; Yang, et al., 2008; Zaman, et al., 2014)  
The H Pl during oil 
transportation process  
Description 
Very Low The probability of occurrence is unlikely to occur but possible 
Low The probability of occurrence is likely once per year 
Medium The probability of occurrence is likely once per quarter 
High The probability of occurrence is likely once per month 
Very High The probability of occurrence is expected once per month 
Table III: Linguistic grades for the consequence severity parameter for each H in the IF part (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii, et al., 
2001; Liu, et al., 2011; Yang, et al., 2008; Zaman, et al., 2014) 
The H Sc during oil 
transportation process 
Description 
Very Low No injury involved and negligible damage to the system; no damage to the environment. 
Low 
Minor medical treatment; slight equipment or system damage but fully functional and 
serviceable; minor environmental damage 
Medium 
Minor injury; moderate incapacity of systems, equipment or facilities that disrupts 
operations; moderate damage to the environment 
High Permanent total disability; damage to major facilities; severe environmental damage 
Very High Death; loss of major facilities; major environmental damage 
Table IV: Linguistic grades for the undetectable probability parameter for each H in the IF part (Pillay and Wang, 2003; Sii, et al., 
2001; Liu, et al., 2011; Yang, et al., 2008; Zaman, et al., 2014) 
The H Dp not being 
detectable before it occurs  
Description 
Very Low Possible to be detected without inspections or maintenance 
Low Possible to be detected through regular inspections or maintenance 
Medium Possible to be detected through intensive inspections or maintenance 
High Difficult to be detected through intensive or regular inspections or maintenance 
Very High Impossible to be detected through intensive or regular inspections or maintenance 
In the FRB, a belief structure is utilised to model the THEN part in the IF-THEN rule. For example (Alyami, 
et al., 2014): 
 Rule 1: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is Very High, THEN R is Very High with 100%, 
High with 0%, Medium with 0%, Low with 0% and Very Low with 0%. 
 Rule 2: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is High, THEN R is Very High with 67%, High with 
33%, Medium with 0%, Low with 0% and Very Low with 0%. 
 Rule 3: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is Medium, THEN R is Very High with 67%, High 
with 0%, Medium with 33%, Low with 0% and Very Low with 0%. 
 Rule 4: IF Pl is Very High, Sc is Very High and Dp is Low, THEN Rs is Very High with 67%, High with 
0%, Medium with 0%, Low with 33% and Very Low with 0%. 
The proportion method has been used to assign belief degrees in the THEN part, for each of the linguistic 
variables in the above four rules (Alyami, et al., 2014). To simplify this, the risk factors that obtain the same 
grade in the IF part, are divided by the total number of parameters. To rationalise the assignment of the degree 
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where D(x) is the belief degree assigned to Very High, High, Medium, Low, or Very Low in the THEN 
part, n represents the number of factors in the IF part, and ai(x) describes the grades of a specific linguistic 
variable of each attribute associated with a targeted Hs. For example, in Rule 1, three risk factors are assigned 
the Very High grade in the IF part. Therefore, the belief degree for Very High in the THEN part is calculated 
as 100% (3/3 = 100%). Conversely, two risk parameters have the Very High grade and one gets the High 
grade in the IF part in Rule 2. Therefore, the belief degrees belonging to Very High and High in the THEN 
part are 67% (2/3 = 67%) and 33% (1/3 = 33%), respectively. 125 rules (5 × 5 × 5) with their belief degrees 
are established (Alyami, et al., 2014) (see Table V). 
C. Develop a BN Model and Aggregate the Rules by Using BN (Steps 3 and 4) 
Traditional fuzzy rule aggregation techniques such as max-min operation can cause loss of information in 
the rule combination process. Other fuzzy rule aggregation methods such as Technique for Order of Preference 
by Similarity to Ideal Solutions (TOPSIS) and VIKOR have the advantages in ranking failures, but suffer in 
expressing the riskiness of each failure (Emovon, et al. 2015; Song, et al. 2013). Evidential Reasoning (ER), 
addressing the above concerns, involves very complex calculation formulas that are not friendly to 
mathematically unsophisticated users (John, et al., 2014). BN is capable to confirm the relationship between 
the Hs and the established FRB with belief structure in FMEA to detect failures riskiness (Yang, et al., 2008). 
In this regards, a BN model is developed to rank the identified PTSs’ hazards in terms of their risk levels. BN 
is performed to build a qualitative network capable of representing all the Hs and their dependencies (i.e. the 
three risk parameters).  
To aggregate the rules using a BN, the developed rules should first be presented in a conditional probability 
form. For example, Rule 2 in Table V is presented as follows:  
R2: IF Very High (P1), Very High (S1) and High (D2), THEN {(0.67, Very High (R1)), (0.33, High (R2)), (0, 
Medium (R3)), (0, Low (R4)), (0, Very Low (R5)),}. 
The conditional probability of Rule 2 can be expressed as follows: 
Given P1, S1 and D2, the probability of Rh (h = 1,…,5) is (0.67, 0.33, 0, 0, 0) or  
     
)0,0,0,33.0,67.0(),,( 211  DSPRi
       
(2) 
where “  ” symbolises conditional probability.   
The established IF-THEN rules within FMEA can be modelled and transferred by using the BN technique 
in four nodes. Pl, Sc and Dp represent the parent nodes of each H. These three parent nodes are connected to 
an H (Node Rh). By converting the overall rule base into a customized BN model, the marginal probability of 
the H (i.e. child node) can be computed, through simplifying the risk inference mechanism of the rule-base 
failure criticality evaluation. To marginalise Node Rh, the needed conditional probability table P(RhPl, Sc, Dp), 
can be obtain by using Eq. 2 and Table V, which symbolises a 5 × 5 × 5 × 5 table combination, having the 
values P(RhPl, Sc, Dp) (h, l, c, p = 1,…,5) (Yang et al., 2008). 
Table V: The established IF-THEN rules with belief structure for PTSs risk evaluation 
Rule 
No 
Risk Parameters in the IF Part Belief Degree in the THEN Part 
Pl Sc DP VH H M L VL 
1 VH(P1) VH(S1) VH(D1) 1 0 0 0 0 
2 VH(P1) VH(S1) H(D2) 0.67 0.33 0 0 0 
3 VH(P1) VH(S1) M(D3) 0.67 0 0.33 0 0 
4 VH(P1) VH(S1) L(D4) 0.67 0 0 0.33 0 
5 VH(P1) VH(S1) VL(D5) 0.67 0 0 0 0.33 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... 
121 VL(P5) VL(S5) VH(D1) 0.33 0 0 0 0.67 
122 VL(P5) VL(S5) H(D2) 0 0.33 0 0 0.67 
123 VL(P5) VL(S5) M(D3) 0 0 0.33 0 0.67 
124 VL(P5) VL(S5) L(D4) 0 0 0 0.33 0.67 
125 VL(P5) VL(S5) VL(D5) 0 0 0 0 1 
Each of the identified PTSs’ Hs can be evaluated by using experts’ judgements, through considering the 
three risk factors (i.e. Pl, Sc and Dp) and their related defined linguistic grades. Moreover, for assigning the 
belief degree of the linguistic grades of each individual factor, the averaging technique is used to combine the 
judgements from multiple experts for calculating the prior probabilities (i.e. P(Pl), P(Sc) and P(Dp)) of the 
three parent nodes, Pl, Sc and Dp. As a result, the marginal probability of each H (Rh) can be calculated as 
follows (Yang, et al., 2008) 








l c p pclpclhh
DSPDSPRR                                                                       
     (h = 1,…,5)       (3) 
D. Prioritise the PTSs’ Hazards (Step 5) 
In the FRBN model, the marginal probability of each H is presented by the five linguistic terms (i.e. Very 
High, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low). To prioritise the PTSs’ hazards, a utility values approach (URh) 
developed by Yang (2001) is used in this study. Consequently, the output belief degree of each Hs is 
synthesized in one single value as follows: 
   Rhh h URH   
5
1
      
  
(4) 
where P(βh) is the H’s belief degree for each linguistic term. UR = (1,2,3,4,5) and URh = (0,0.25,0.5,0.75,1) 
based on a linear distribution. RH is the utility of the selected hazard. The higher the RH value is, the 
significant the level of risk of the hazard. 
E. Sensitivity analysis (Step 6) 
Sensitivity analysis is the validation method used in order to corroborate the results. Forrester, et al., (2001) 
previously mentioned that sensitivity analysis is a procedure that is usually performed, by a series of tests to 
examine how sensitive is the change that occurs in the model by setting different parameter values (i.e. 
changing input belief degrees). The sensitivity analysis must at least meet the following axioms (Yang et al., 
2009b; Jones, et al., 2010): 
Axiom 1: A slight increase/decrease in the belief degree of any of the linguistic variables of each input 
node leads to an increase/decrease in the output belief degree. 
Axiom 2: The total influence measures of the combination of the probability variations from 𝑥 parameters 
(evidence) should be always greater than the one from the set of 𝑥 − (𝑦 ∈ 𝑥) parameters (sub-evidence). 
IV. CASE STUDY 
A case study is carried out in this paper, to determine how the methodology can be employed to evaluate 
the Hs associated with a specific PTS being investigated. This assessment is performed on the system of one 
of the world major petroleum producers. Due to confidentiality reasons, the associated ports and transport 
operators are kept anonymous. Three questionnaires were first constructed to collect the failure input 
information from experts involved in the investigated PTS. The selected experts are actively working at 
inshore and offshore terminals and petroleum ports, tankers, and pipeline systems, with over 20 years’ 
working experience.  
In order to evaluate the PTS’ Hs, the system’ Hs are identified (step one). Therefore, an extensive literature 
review has been carried out to determine the PTSs (ports, ships and pipeline systems) operational Hs. 
Furthermore, the Hs identified from literature review are further validated by experts through conducting a 
brainstorming technique within face-to-face meetings which took place in 2015 and 2016, respectively. 
Through conducting a literature review and gathering experts’ personal experience, 42, 61, and 10 hazards 
have been identified within port, ship, and pipeline sub-systems, respectively as illustrated in Table I. 
In step two, the established FRB table in section III.C is used. With the aim of gathering the failure 
information for the identified PTS’ Hs, three questionnaires were constructed and presented to fifteen experts 
(five from each operational sector), each with more than 20 years’ experience in the system’s operation. The 
first questionnaire was designed to evaluate the 42 Hs related to the petroleum ports. This survey was sent to 
five experts in the port operation sector. The second and third questionnaires were designed to evaluate the 
Hs associated with the tankers and pipelines respectively. The participants were invited to evaluate each of 
the Hs in their operation sector with respect to the three risk parameters. The participants asked to indicate an 
appropriate assessment for the three attributes of each Hs by using the described linguistic grades in Tables 
II, III and IV.  
After the authors received the feedbacks from the participants, the arithmetic mean was employed in order 
to collect the average of the three risk parameters of the 113 Hs (i.e. 42 (port) + 61 (ship) + 10 (pipeline)). 
The resulting values were then used in the form of prior probabilities (step 4). For example, for assessing the 
hazard of Company Policies (PPHC) by using the arithmetic averaging technique, the parameter P Very High 
is presented as a sample. Experts 1 - 5 have assessed the parameter P Very High as: 5%, 10%, 10%, 5%, and 10%. 
By using the arithmetic mean, the average degree of belief is 8%. The same technique is used to identify the 
belief degree for PPHC hazard parameters (Table VI) and the other 112 Hs.    
Table VI: Prior probability of Pl, Sc and Dp for PPHC 
Risk Parameters Average Degree of Belief in % 
P 
Very High 8 
High 13.1111 
Medium 21. 1111 
Low 33. 8889 
Very Low 23.8889 
S 
Very High 10 
High 12. 7778 
Medium 22. 7778 
Low 29.4444 
Very Low 25 
D 




Very Low 21.1111 
In step three, BN based FMEA models have been developed. Based on the experts’ analysis, Pl, Sc and Dp 
grades for each H were estimnated. By considering the complexity of the manual calculation, a computer 
software tool (i.e. Hugin software) is used to compute marginal probability for each of the 113 Hs that occur 
in the investigated PTS. The obtained degree of believe from step four for PPHC hazard is presented in Fig. 
3. 
 
Fig.3: The analysis of PPHC by Hugin software 
As a result, the analysis values of PPHC can be expressed by using Eq. 3 as follows: 
P(Rh  Pl, Sc, Dp) = (7.96, 14, 22.85, 30.18, 25) 
In step five, based on Eq. 4 and as shown in Table VII, the utility value of PPHC is evaluated as 37.43. 
Table VII: The steps for calculating the utility value of PPHC 
𝑅ℎ Very High High Medium Low Very Low 

















Ƥ (𝑅ℎ) 7.96% 14% 22.85% 30.18% 25% 




Ƥ (𝑅ℎ) 𝑈𝑅ℎ 7. 96% 10.5% 11.42% 7.54% 0 




Table VIII: Utility value of the 42 Petroleum port hazards 
 Hs Utility value Ranking 
H 1  Company Policies  37.43 38 
H 2 Company Standards  47.08 17 
H 3 Management Procedure 47.27 16 
H 4 Inattention 47.64 12 
H 5 Neglect  47.45 13 
H 6 Fatigue  43.29 28 
H 7 Skills  47.41 14 
H 8 Overfill  42.22 29 
H 9 SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) Not Followed  46.71 19 
H 10 Overpressure  45.88 24 
H 11 Release From Loading Arm/SBM  41.94 30 
H 12 Understaffing  47.36 15 
H 13 Breakdown of Communication  49.72 8 
H 14 Communication Misunderstanding  50.42 6 
H 15 Wrong Signals  47.78 11 
H 16 Procedural Failure  54.44 1 
H 17 Collision between Ship and Other Ship/Berth 53.75 3 
H 18 Lack of Tools/Spare Parts  50 7 
H 19  Inappropriate maintenance practice  46.71 19 
H 20 Use of Inappropriate Tools/Spare Parts 46.62 21 
H 21 Maintenance Omission 45.37 26 
H 22 Lack of Communication System 50.60 5 
H 23 Lack of Lighting System 46.25 23 
H 24 Lack of Movable Facilities 40.92 33 
H 25 A/C System Failure 41.62 31 
H 26 Control System Failure 49.72 8 
H 27 Instrument Failure 49.21 10 
H 28 Valve Failure 44.08 27 
H 29 Hose/Pump Failure 31.57 41 
H 30 Gasket Failure 52.87 4 
H 31 Pipeline Failure 46.43 22 
H 32 Loading Arm/SBM Failure 46.94 18 
H 33 Power Failure 54.21 2 
H 34 Cathodic Protection Failure 45.55 25 
H 35 Heavy Rainfall 41.57 32 
H 36 Flood 35.92 39 
H 37 Snow 24.95 42 
H 38 Hurricane 33.70 40 
H 39 Tornadoes 38.70 36 
H 40  Lightning 38.24 37 
H 41 Earthquake 39.94 34 
H 42 Tsunami 38.97 35 
Table IX: Utility value of the 61 Ship transportation hazards  
 Hs Utility value Ranking 
H 1 Main Engine Failure (Collision) 49.40 2 
H 2 Bridge Navigation Equipment Failure (Collision) 44.28 15 
H 3 Communication System Failure (Collision) 44.28 15 
H 4 Wrong use of Navigation Equipment (Collision) 48.19 4 
H 5 Lack of Communication (Collision) 40.14 35 
H 6 Failure to Follow Operational Procedure (Collision) 40.21 33 
H 7 Action To Avoid Collision (Collision) 49.19 3 
H 8 Human Inattention (Collision) 42.29 26 
H 9 Human Neglect (Collision) 44.93 11 
H 10 Human Fatigue (Collision) 50.51 1 
H 11 Human Skills (Collision) 44.93 12 
H 12 Weather Condition (Collision) 44.58 13 
H 13 Third Party Activity (Collision) 37.85 48 
H 14 Main Engine Failure (Grounding) 43.61 19 
H 15 Communication System Failure (Grounding) 43.05 22 
H 16 Bridge Navigation Equipment Failure (Grounding) 41.67 28 
H 17 Wrong use of Navigation Equipment (Grounding) 39.65 38 
H 18 Lack of Communication (Grounding) 38.61 44 
H 19 Failure to Follow Operational Procedure (Grounding) 39.24 41 
H 20 Rout Selection (Grounding) 45.24 10 
H 21 Using Inappropriate Chart (Grounding) 40.28 32 
H 22 Human Inattention (Grounding) 39.58 39 
H 23 Human Neglect (Grounding) 41.94 27 
H 24 Human Fatigue (Grounding) 46.53 7 
H 25 Human Skills (Grounding) 40.49 30 
H 26 Weather Condition (Grounding) 43.99 18 
H 27 Third Party Activity (Grounding) 40.42 31 
H 28 Water Depth (Grounding) 43.05 22 
H 29 Construction Failure (Hull Failure) 39.93 36 
H 30 Corrosion (Hull Failure) 40.21 33 
H 31 Maintenance Failure (Hull Failure) 46.46 8 
H 32 Stowage Planning Failure  (Hull Failure) 44.24 17 
H 33 Collision (Hull Failure) 39.72 37 
H 34 Grounding (Hull Failure) 44.31 14 
H 35 Human Inattention (Fire/Explosion) 43.40 20 
H 36 Human Neglect (Fire/Explosion) 45.49 9 
H 37 Human Skills (Fire/Explosion) 42.68 25 
H 38 Inert Gas/Ventilation System Failure(Fire/Explosion) 46.6 6 
H 39 Electric Failure (Fire/Explosion) 43.19 21 
H 40 Pumping Room Failure (Fire/Explosion) 38.19 46 
H 41 Main Engine Failure (Fire/Explosion) 33.37 58 
H 42 Heating system Failure (Fire/Explosion) 29.18 61 
H 43 Spread of Fire From Other Object (Fire/Explosion) 38.58 45 
H 44 Sabotage (Fire/Explosion) 37.71 50 
H 45 Weather Condition (Fire/Explosion) 35.66 54 
H 46 Pipe Failure (Equipment  Failure) 37.36 51 
H 47 Valve Failure (Equipment  Failure) 34.51 55 
H 48 Pump Failure (Equipment  Failure) 37.85 48 
H 49 Tank Gauging System (Equipment  Failure) 32.99 59 
H 50 Manifold Failure (Equipment  Failure) 41.46 29 
H 51 Power Failure (Equipment  Failure) 37.22 52 
H 52 Heating System Failure (Equipment  Failure) 33.82 57 
H 53 Loading Computer (Equipment  Failure) 29.86 60 
H 54 Maintenance Error (Equipment  Failure) 39.31 40 
H 55 Maintenance Omission (Equipment  Failure) 38.96 42 
H 56 Lack of Communication (Equipment  Failure)  38.89 43 
H 57 Procedural Failure (Equipment  Failure) 34.1 56 
H 58 Human Inattention (Equipment  Failure) 38.05 47 
H 59 Human Neglect (Equipment  Failure) 42.71 24 
H 60 Human Fatigue (Equipment  Failure) 47.67 5 
H 61 Human Skills (Equipment  Failure) 36.29 53 
Table X: Utility value of the 10 pipeline transportation hazards 
 Hs Utility value Ranking 
H 1 Sabotage 35.97 1 
H 2 Workers Actions 32.22 9 
H 3 Weather Condition 32.64 6 
H 4 Geological Hazards 32.5 7 
H 5 Material Failure 34.44 3 
H 6 Construction Failure 32.78 4 
H 7 Maintenance Failure 34.58 2 
H 8 Failure to Follow Procedure 29.86 10 
H 9 Internal Corrosion 32.78 4 
H 10 External Corrosion 32.5 7 
      Based on the identified utility value for each of the identified PTS’ Hs, the hazard Procedural Failure is 
the most important hazard within seaport system, followed by Power Failure, Wrong use of Navigation 
Equipment and Ventilation System Failure (see Table VIII). By using the same procedure, the hazards Ship 
Collision due to Human Fatigue, Ship Collision due to Main Engine Failure, Action to Avoid Collision, 
Sabotage, Pipeline System Maintenance Failure, and Pipeline Material Failure are the most important hazards 
within the tankers and pipelines respectively (see Table IX and Table X). After utilising the belief degree of 
and prioritising the 113 Hs associated with the PTSs (i.e. port and transportation modes’ hazards), the hazard 
Procedural Failure (PTHP), is the most significant hazard in this system (see Table XI). 
Table XI: Utility Value of the most significant hazards in each operational system within the PTSs  
 Hs Utility Value Ranking 
H16 Procedural Failure  54.44 1 
H 33 Power Failure 54.21 2 
H 17 Collision between Ship and Other Ship/Berth  53.75 3 
H 10 Human Fatigue (Collision) 50.51 4 
H 1 Main Engine Failure (Collision) 49.4 5 
H 7 Action To Avoid Collision (Collision) 49.19 6 
H 1 Sabotage 35.97 7 
H 7 Maintenance Failure 34.58 8 
H 5 Material Failure 34.44 9 
 In the final step (i.e. step five), two axioms are introduced in order to examine the sensitivity of the changes 
that are going to occur to the hazard marginal probability, by changing the prior probabilities of the three parent 
nodes. By performing axiom 1 (i.e. increasing the belief degree of Likelihood 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ =100%"), the belief 
degree value of the node "likelihood" is updated to be 100% “Very High” (see Fig. 4). As a result, the output 
value of the node PPHC 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ has become greater than its original value by changing its belief degree value 
from 8 % to 38.63 %. 
 
Fig. 4: Examine the sensitivity of PPHC by Hugin software given the evidence for node “𝑳𝒊𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒅𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎%" 
 Through preforming axiom 2 for the same hazard (i.e. increasing the belief degree for two nodes “Likelihood 
𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ and “Probability 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ =100%"), led to a change "PPHC 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ assessment output from 8% to 70%, 
as illustrate in Fig. 5. 
 
Fig. 5: Examine the sensitivity of PPHC by Hugin software given the evidence for node“𝑳𝒊𝒌𝒆𝒍𝒊𝒉𝒐𝒐𝒅𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎%" and 
“𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝑽𝒆𝒓𝒚 𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉 = 𝟏𝟎𝟎%" 
 By carrying out axiom 1 (i.e. increasing the belief degree of Likelihood 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ =100%") and axiom 2 (i.e. 
increasing the belief degree for both “Likelihood 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ and “Probability 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ =100%") for all the hazards, 
the results of these axioms clarify the model’s sensitivity whilst changing the inputs degree of belief (see Fig. 
6). This highlights that output value keeps consistent with axiom 1 to axiom 2. 
 
Fig. 6: The sensitivity analysis of the petroleum port system 42 hazards 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Evaluation of PTS operational hazards is a key element for the system overall safety, and also can 
effectively assist decision-makers in enhancing its performance. This study is one of the first that deals with 
data uncertainty problems in PTSs from the perspective of a whole PTS system. In this paper, a mathematical 
model integrates FRB theory and BN to analyse the PTSs’ operational hazards to overcome the disadvantages 
of these two methods. The FRBR method uses domain expert knowledge in the form of fuzzy IF-Then rules, 
and the BN mechanism to synthesize the rules for prioritising the PTSs’ Hs.  
In the proposed methodology, firstly, 113 hazards associated with the PTSs operations are identified. 
Secondly, an FRB with a belief structure in FMEA is established. Thirdly, the rules are aggregated by using 
the developed BN model. Fourthly, the PTSs’ hazards are ranked by using the utility approach. Finally, the 
sensitivity for each of the identified hazards is examined by using a sensitivity analysis technique. The results 
from the case study reveal that the proposed method is capable of analysing the local levels of the PTSs and 
provide an improved evaluation technique for PTSs’ risk assessment. In terms of the case study based on one 
of the world major petroleum producers, Procedural Failure, Ship Collision due to Human Fatigue and 
Sabotage are its PTS’ most significant Hs. The results highlight the importance of human-related hazards in 
each of the three operational systems (i.e. ports, tankers and pipelines) within the PTSs. From previous 
engineering studies, human-related hazards have a significant impact on system operations, where the 
consequences of an operational mistake might lead to economic and environmental disasters. In addition, the 
results highlight that machine and natural-related hazards should not be neglected within the operation of 
PTSs, due to the severity of the consequences that might affect the environment and industry.  
The proposed assessment methodology provides decision-makers with a rational risk-ranking technique 
for enhancing the safety of PTSs. In other words, the proposed method shows realistic and flexible results by 
describing the failure information based on real-life situations.  
This paper mainly focuses on evaluating the local levels of the PTSs while it, for the first time, enables the 
risk of hazards in different sub-systems of PTSs to be tackled on the same universe. However, controlling the 
operational risk at a local level may not ensure the safety of the PTSs. In future work, the global level of the 
PTSs will be evaluated. In this regards, advanced uncertainty techniques such as evidential reasoning seems 
promising.    
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